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1. Interference control is an ability to protect ongoing cognitive processing from 
distractors. 
 
2. Dual-task paradigms provide important information to elucidate the flexible allocation 
of cognitive resource for interference control. 
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Interference control is the ability to protect ongoing cognitive processing from internal 
or environmental distraction. For an individual to achieve interference control 
appropriately, either a control mechanism to coordinate multiple processing streams, 
such as the central executive in working memory, a mechanism to flexibly allocate the 
cognitive resource with a limited capacity for performing each task, or both, are needed. 
Through the use of dual-task paradigms, animal studies have provided important 
information to elucidate the neural mechanisms of the central executive and the flexible 
allocation of cognitive resource. These animal studies should help to promote our 





Interference control, which is the ability to protect ongoing cognitive processing from 
internal or environmental distraction, has long been a subject of interest in cognitive 
psychology. The ability to achieve interference control is strongly correlated with the 
performance of higher-order cognitive functions such as language comprehension, 
problem-solving, and fluid intelligence. Human cognition studies have focused on 
inhibition-related functions [1-3], and dual-task paradigms have been used to investigate 
the mechanisms that underlie interference control. The general principle of the dual-task 
paradigm is for subjects to perform two relatively complex tasks simultaneously, each 
of which includes a distinct goal and stimulus-response association. Despite the 
remarkable flexibility of cognitive abilities, human subjects often exhibit decreased 
performance in either or both component tasks of the dual-task paradigm, since 
information processing for one task interferes with the other [4]. The addition of a more 
cognitively demanding secondary task can strongly disrupt performance of the primary 
task. Since heavy cognitive demands on the information processing system are thought 
to produce dual-task interference, either a control mechanism to coordinate multiple 
processing streams, such as the central executive in working memory model [5,6], or a 
control mechanism to flexibly allocate cognitive resource for each task [7,8], is required 
in addition to the control process for each component task. Recent behavioral studies 
have indicated that humans and animals exhibit a similar dual-task interference effect. 
Therefore, animal studies may be able to provide valuable insight to understand the 
neural mechanisms of interference control. This review focuses on the results obtained 
using dual-task paradigms and explains how animal studies help to elucidate the neural 
mechanisms of interference control. 
 
Behavioral analyses of the dual-task interference effect in animals 
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Behavioral analyses of the interference effect in dual-task conditions have been 
conducted in studies using animals (Table 1). Although these experiments were 
conducted under dual-task conditions, some examined the functional similarity of 
short-term memory (STM) processes between humans and animals, rather than the 
psychological mechanisms related to dual-task interference. In humans, rehearsal is 
negatively affected when a secondary task is introduced during the retention period of 
the primary STM task. Therefore, if the STM is a functionally equivalent process in 
humans and animals, a similar negative effect on the rehearsal process would be 
expected in behavioral performance of dual tasks in animals.  
Moise [9] examined this issue using monkeys. In the dual-task, a reaction time 
(RT) task was repeatedly inserted during the retention interval (< 30 s) of a delayed 
matching-to-sample (DMS) task. In the RT task, monkeys were required to quickly 
touch an illuminated cue. The rationale was that, if the monkey’s maintenance of 
memoranda relied on effortful rehearsal processes, the introduction of RT trials during 
the retention period should disrupt the performance of the DMS task, since effort was 
required to perform RT trials. In fact, DMS performance was markedly disrupted by the 
insertion of RT trials to a degree proportional to the number of inserted RT trials. The 
author concluded that the performance in both the DMS and RT required some degree 
of active processing which taxed a common capacity-limited cognitive resource, and 
that the nature of memory maintenance in DMS performance in monkeys was 
reminiscent of active rehearsal in human STM.  
On the other hand, Washburn and Astur [10] also investigated whether or not 
monkeys could rehearse visual short-term memoranda. They inserted two secondary 
tasks during a variable retention interval (< 48 sec) in the DMS task. The secondary task 
was either manual tracking of a moving circle or judgment of the number ‘2’. Insertion 
of these secondary tasks disrupted the performance of the DMS task. However, manual 
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tracking produced no more disruptive effects than passive viewing of a moving circle, 
and the response times in the numerical judgment task were comparable during a 
retention interval and an intertrial interval of the DMS task. Therefore, the authors 
concluded that monkeys did not rely on active rehearsal processes to maintain 
memoranda.  
Although contradictory results have been obtained from experiments that 
examined the cross-species similarity of STM, these studies showed that, with the 
addition of relatively simple secondary tasks, a dual-task interference effect can be 
observed in monkeys. Subsequent studies demonstrated that not only monkeys [11,12] 
but also pigeons [13,14] and rats [15-19] can also perform dual-tasks in various 
conditions and also exhibit dual-task interference effects analogous to those in humans 
(Table 1). Recently, Smith et al. [12] applied the dual-task method to examine whether 
or not metacognitive process can be dissociated from perceptual-level process using 
monkeys. In the dual-task condition, a metacognitive task was inserted during the 
retention period of a DMS task or a STM task. The metacognitive task included a 
sparse-middle-dense discrimination of random dots and the ‘uncertain’ response when 
the monkey was difficult to discriminate. As a result, a dual-task interference effect was 
observed. In addition, they found that the number of ‘uncertain’ responses dramatically 
decreased in the dual-task condition, while the performance of the sparse-middle-dense 
discrimination was not affected. These results indicate that the dual-task method can 
dissociate a lower level perceptual process from a higher level decisional process, such 
as metacognition. Thus, the dual-task paradigm is useful not only for examining the 
mechanism of interference control but also for examining other higher cognitive 
functions such as metacognition. 
The load-dependent effect of dual-task interference is an important 
characteristic of human dual-task performance [20,21] and an important phenomenon to 
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examine the mechanism of interference control. Basile and Hampton [11] showed that 
this effect was also evident in monkey dual-task performance. In their study, a DMS 
task was coupled with one of four secondary tasks that required different levels of 
cognitive demand (Figure 1a): (1) no secondary task, (2) a motor-only task, in which 
monkeys needed to touch a blue square presented at the screen corner, (3) an image 
perception task, in which monkeys needed to touch an unclassifiable complex image, 
and (4) a classification task, in which monkeys needed to classify an image as a bird, 
fish, flower, or person. Either four images (small set) or 1400 images (large set) were 
used as target images in the DMS task. In the small-set condition, due to the frequent 
appearance of the same images across trials, a target image would be hard to distinguish 
from distractors based solely on familiarity during the memory test. In contrast, the 
cognitive effort was less demanding in the large-set condition, since the infrequent 
appearance of a target image made it easier to distinguish it from distractors based on 
familiarity. The critical finding was that the addition of the secondary task impaired 
DMS performance only in the small-set condition in a load-dependent manner (Figure 
1b). This result indicates that the short-term maintenance of familiar information 
requires an active resource-demanding process similar to the human rehearsal process. 
This result also indicates that the additive effect of the magnitude of DMS performance 
deficits is strongly similar to the dual-task interference effect in humans. Thus, these 
findings validate the effectiveness of the use of primate models to investigate the neural 
mechanisms that underlie human dual-task interference effects. Similar additive effects 
were also observed in rats [17, 18] and pigeons [13]. The similarity of the dual-task 
interference effects in humans and animals suggests the presence of common cognitive 
processes related to dual-task interference. This could make it possible to apply a 
variety of neurobiological techniques to nonhuman primates to investigate the neural 
mechanisms related to dual-task interference effects.  
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Neural mechanisms of dual-task interference effects in monkeys 
fMRI studies have shown that the lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) is involved in 
dual-task interference effects [3,22-26]. The precise roles of the LPFC in dual-task 
interference effects and their neural mechanisms remain largely unknown [22, 27].  
However, since the cognitive capacity limitations in humans and monkeys have similar 
characteristics [28,29], it is expected that a common neural mechanism for the flexible 
allocation of cognitive resource is present in both humans and monkeys while they 
perform dual tasks. Therefore, neurophysiological studies using monkeys could provide 
some important evidence for understanding the neural mechanisms of dual-task 
interference. 
Single-neuron recordings from monkeys performing dual tasks are beginning to 
reveal the neural mechanisms responsible for dual-task interference [30-33] (Table 1). 
In the monkey’s lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC), Wise and colleagues [30, 31] 
examined the neural mechanisms related to interference effects using a dual-task-like 
paradigm (Figure 2a). In their task, while monkeys looked at a fixation point at the 
center of a screen, a visual cue was first presented at one position and then revolved 
around the fixation point to a second position. The brightness of the visual cue then 
either increased or decreased after the end of the delay period (1.0 – 2.5 sec), and this 
informed the monkeys to make a saccade to the first or second position, respectively. 
Therefore, monkeys were required to attend to the visual cue at the second position to 
detect the change in brightness while remembering the fist position during the delay 
period. The authors found ‘specialized’ neurons that encoded either the remembered or 
attended position (Figure 2b). They also found a substantial number of ‘multi-tasking’ 
neurons that encoded both the remembered and attended positions (Figure 2c). 
Multi-tasking neurons exhibited several computational advantages over specialized 
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neurons in resolving dual-task interference effects. For example, multi-tasking neurons 
encoded different (often diametrically opposite) positions for both attention and 
memory and exhibited stronger spatial tunings than specialized neurons, thereby 
representing a larger amount of information than specialized neurons (Figure 2d). 
These results suggest that the activities of multi-tasking neurons in the LPFC may 
constitute an important part of neural processes related to dual-task interference.  
Recently, Watanabe and Funahashi [33] investigated the neural mechanism of 
dual-task interference in the monkey LPFC using a dual task that consisted of a spatial 
memory task [34] and a spatial attention task [35] with a varying load (Figure 3a). In 
this experiment, monkeys were required to remember the location of a visual cue to 
make a saccade in the later memory test (memory task component). At the same time, 
they were also required to attend to a location where a small circle was presented on the 
monitor to perform quick lever-release when they detected that the color of the circle 
had changed (attention task component). The difficulty of the attention task was 
parametrically manipulated by varying the location of the to-be-attended circle (Figure 
3b). The rationale of the experiment was that, if LPFC neurons participate in the 
processing of dual-task interference, delay-period activity, which was thought to 
represent information regarding the visual cue for the memory task [36,37], would be 
affected depending on the difficulty of performing the concurrent attention task. 
Behavioral performance of the memory task was impaired to a degree 
proportional to the difficulty of performing the concurrent attention task (Figure 3c). 
Analyses of LPFC neuron activities showed that both the memory and attention tasks 
recruited the same neural population in the LPFC that participated in spatial information 
processing. Specifically, sustained delay-period activities that encoded the location of 
the visual cue for the memory task were significantly attenuated by concurrent 
performance of the attention task, and a more difficult attention task produced a more 
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severe attenuation in delay-period activity (Figure 3d). These results demonstrate that 
the neural locus of dual-task interference resides in the competitive overloaded 
recruitment of the neural population that participates in similar information processing 
by two concurrently performed tasks, as has been postulated in human neuroimaging 
studies [23,38]. These findings also indicate that the psychological concept of 
processing resources [7,8] could be implemented in the brain as the limited 
information-processing capacity of single neurons in the LPFC. 
 A series of single-neuron recording experiments have shown that the 
representation of perceptual distractors was significantly suppressed in the LPFC [39], 
thereby protecting the sustained representation of behaviorally relevant information 
throughout the distractor-filled delay period [40, 41]. However, the characteristics of 
LPFC activities observed in the dual-task conditions were different than the 
characteristics of those elicited by the presentation of perceptual distractors. Therefore, 
although the LPFC plays a critical role in the processing of both perceptual [42, 43] and 
dual-task interference [22,44], these two processes may depend on distinct neural 
circuitries. Future investigation is needed to directly compare these two neural processes 
using behavioral tasks that employ the same sensory stimuli in both perceptual and 
interference conditions. 
Analyses of neural activities at the end of the secondary task showed another 
important facet of interference effects in the LPFC. Watanabe and Funahashi [33] found 
a significant ‘reawakening’ of neural encoding for the visual cue location in the memory 
task after the end of the attention task (Figure 3e), which indicates that even under the 
presence of the interference effect caused by the attention task, some neural 
mechanisms in the LPFC could operate to compensate for the interference effect 
produced by the attention task. Similar results have been reported by Miyazaki et al. 
[32], who compared the activities of LPFC neurons and dorsal premotor neurons while 
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monkeys performed a dual task, which consisted of memory-guided bimanual actions 
(primary task) and visually-guided bimanual actions (secondary task). The observed 
post-interference reactivation of the primary-task information showed that the LPFC 
played an important role in exerting compensatory control over the interference by the 
secondary task. Flexible prioritization among multiple streams of concurrent task 
processing is critical for the coordination of dual-task performance. The observed 
reactivation may correspond to the neural implementation of adaptive task coordination 
in the LPFC [22, 24]. 
 
Conclusions 
Behavioral analyses and physiological investigations of dual-task interference using 
monkeys are beginning to provide evidence regarding the neural mechanisms for 
interference control. The similarity of the behavioral patterns caused by dual-task 
interference in humans and monkeys and the capability to elucidate the fine details of 
neural computations by neurophysiological methods support the view that the primate 
model is an appropriate method for understanding the details of the neural mechanisms 
of the interference control and the flexible allocation of cognitive recourse.  
 
 





This work was supported in part by Grant-in-Aids for Scientific Research (Nos. 
21240024 and 25240021) from the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, 
 11 
Science and Technology (MEXT) to SF and by Research Fellowships for Young 







1. Friedman NP, Miyake A: The relations among inhibition and interference 
control functions: a latent-variable analysis. J Exp Psychol Gen 2004, 133: 
101-135. 
2. Nee DE, Jonides J: Dissociable interference-control processes in perception and 
memory. Psychol Sci 2008, 19: 490-500. 
3. Forstmann BU, van den Wildenberg WPM, Ridderinkhof KR: Neural mechanisms, 
temporal dynamics, and individual differences in interference control. J Cogn 
Neurosci 2008, 20: 1854-1865. 
4. ● Pashler H: Dual-task interference in simple tasks: data and theory. Psychol 
Bull 1994, 116: 220-244. 
The concept, theories, and mechanisms of the dual-task interference are discussed.  
 
5. Baddeley A, Hitch GJ: Working memory. In The Psychology of Learning and 
Motivation, vol. 8. Edited by Bower GH. New York; Academic Press: 1974. 
6. ● Baddeley A: Working memory: looking back and looking forward. Nature Rev 
Neurosci 2003, 4: 829-839. 
Baddeley’s explanation of his most recent model of working memory. 
 
7. Kahneman D: Attention and Effort. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall; 1973. 
8. Wickens CD: Multiple resources and performance prediction. Theor Issues 
Ergon 2002, 3: 159–177. 
9. Moise SL: Short-term retention in Macaca speciosa following interpolated 
activity during delayed matching from sample. J Comp Physiol Psychol 1970, 73: 
506–514. 
 13 
10. Washburn DA, Astur RS: Nonverbal working memory of humans and monkeys: 
Rehearsal in the sketchpad? Mem Cognit 1998, 26: 277–286. 
11. ● Basile BM, Hampton RR: Dissociation of active working memory and passive 
recognition in rhesus monkeys. Cognition 2013, 126: 391–396. 
This study demonstrated a load-dependent effect of the dual-task interference in 
monkeys. An additive effect of the primary- and secondary-task loads on the magnitude 
of the deficits in the primary task performance provides similarity in the dual-task 
performance in humans. 
 
12. Smith JD, Coutinho MV, Church BA, Beran MJ: Executive-attentional 
uncertainty responses by rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta). J Exp Psychol: 
Gen 2013, 142: 458–475. 
13. Kendrick DF, Rilling M: The role of interpolated stimuli in the retroactive 
interference of pigeon short-term memory. Anim Learn Behav 1984, 12: 
391–401. 
14. Calder A, White KG: In search of consolidation of short-term memory in 
nonhuman animals. Learn Behav 2014, 42: 83–92. 
15. Maki WS, Brokofsky S, Berg B: (1979). Spatial memory in rats: Resistance to 
retroactive interference. Anim Learn Behav 1979, 7: 25–30. 
16. Beatty WW, Shavalia DA: Rat spatial memory: Resistance to retroactive 
interference at long retention intervals. Anim Learn Behav 1980, 8: 550–552.   
17. Roberts WA: Retroactive inhibition in rat spatial memory. Anim Learn 
Behav 1981, 9: 566–574. 
18. Cook RG, Brown MF: Retroactive interference in rat radial maze performance: 
The role of point of delay interpolation and the similarity and amount of 
interpolated material. Anim Learn Behav 1985, 13: 116–120. 
 14 
19. Jarrard LE, Elmes DG: Role of retroactive interference in the spatial memory of 
normal rats and rats with hippocampal lesions. J Comp Physiol Psychol 1982, 
96: 699–711. 
20. Logie RH, Zucco GM, Baddeley AD: Interference with visual short-term 
memory. Acta Psychol 1990, 75: 55-74. 
21. Strayer DL, Johnston WA: Driven to distraction: dual-task studies of simulated 
driving and conversing on a cellular telephone. Psychol Sci 2001, 12: 462–466.  
22. D'Esposito M, Detre JA, Alsop DC, Shin RK, Atlas S, Grossman M: The neural 
basis of the central executive system of working memory. Nature 1995, 378: 
279–281.  
23. Klingberg T: Concurrent performance of two working memory tasks: potential 
mechanisms of interference. Cereb Cortex 1998, 8: 593-601. 
24. Koechlin E, Basso G, Pietrini P, Panzer S, Grafman J: The role of the anterior 
prefrontal cortex in human cognition. Nature 1999, 399: 148–151.  
25. Adcock RA, Constable RT, Gore JC, Goldman-Rakic PS: Functional 
neuroanatomy of executive processes involved in dual-task performance. Proc 
Natl Acad Sci USA 2000, 97: 3567-3572. 
26. Derrfuss J, Brass M, von Cramon DY: Cognitive control in the posterior 
frontolateral cortex: evidence from common activations in task coordination, 
interference control, and working memory. Neuroimage 2004, 23: 604-612. 
27. Klingberg T, Roland PE: Interference between two concurrent tasks is associated 
with activation of overlapping fields in the cortex. Brain Res Cogn Brain Res 
1997, 6: 1–8. 
28. Buschman TJ, Siegel M, Roy JE, Miller EK: Neural substrates of cognitive 
capacity limitations. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 2011, 108: 11252-11255. 
29. Elmore LC, Ma WJ, Magnotti JF, Leising KJ, Passaro AD, Katz JS, Wright AA: 
 15 
Visual short-term memory compared in rhesus monkeys and humans. Curr Biol 
2011, 21: 975-979. 
30. Lebedev MA, Messinger A, Kralik JD, Wise SP: Representation of attended 
versus remembered locations in prefrontal cortex. PLoS Biol 2004, 2: e365. 
31. ● Messinger A, Lebedev MA, Kralik JD, Wise SP: Multitasking of attention and 
memory functions in the primate prefrontal cortex. J Neurosci 2009, 29: 
5640–5653. 
The authors describe ‘multi-tasking’ neurons in the prefrontal cortex that encode both 
attending as well as memorizing spatial positions in a dual-task situation. This finding 
provides some insight regarding how prefrontal neurons process an emergent demand 
for information processing with excessive capacity, like under the dual-task condition. 
 
32. Miyazaki A, Nakajima T, Shima K, Mushiake H: Neuronal activity in the 
prefrontal cortex during performance of a dual task consisting of a main- and 
an interrupting-task. In Advances in Cognitive Neurodynamics (III). Edited by 
Yamaguchi Y., Springer Netherlands; 2013: 795–801. 
33. ●● Watanabe K, Funahashi S: Neural mechanisms of dual-task interference and 
cognitive capacity limitation in the prefrontal cortex. Nat Neurosci 2014, 17: 
601–611. 
This study describes the neuronal adverse effects uniquely associated with the addition 
of secondary-task demands in monkey lateral prefrontal cortex. The authors provide 
direct neurophysiological evidences for the mechanisms that underlie behavioral 
performance deficits in dual-task situations. This study also demonstrates that the neural 
implementation of the cognitive resources, the hypothetical constructs in cognitive 
psychology to explain the dual-task interference effect, can be studied at the level of 
single-neuron activity by using nonhuman primates. 
 16 
 
34. Funahashi S, Bruce CJ, Goldman-Rakic PS: Mnemonic coding of visual space in 
the monkey’s dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. J Neurophysiol 1989, 61: 331–349.  
35. Kadohisa M, Petrov P, Stokes M, Sigala N, Buckley M, Gaffan D, Kusunoki M, 
Duncan J: Dynamic construction of a coherent attentional state in a prefrontal 
cell population. Neuron 2013, 80: 235-246.  
36. Fuster JM: Unit activity in prefrontal cortex during delayed-response 
performance: neural correlates of transient memory. J Neurophysiol 1973, 36: 
61-78. 
37. Funahashi S, Kubota K: Working memory and prefrontal cortex. Neurosci Res 
1994, 21: 1-11.  
38. Passingham RE: Attention to action. Philos Trans R Soc Lond, B, Biol Sci 1996, 
351: 1473–1479. 
39. Suzuki M, Gottlieb J: Distinct neural mechanisms of distractor suppression in 
the frontal and parietal lobe. Nat Neurosci 2013, 16: 98–104.  
40. Miller EK, Erickson CA, Desimone R: Neural mechanisms of visual working 
memory in prefrontal cortex of the macaque. J Neurosci 1996, 16: 5154–5167. 
41. Qi X, Katsuki F, Meyer T, Rawley JB, Zhou X, Douglas KL, Constantinidis C: 
Comparison of neural activity related to working memory in primate 
dorsolateral prefrontal and posterior parietal cortex. Front Syst Neurosci 
2010, 4: 12, 1–11.  
42. Malmo RB: Interference factors in delayed response in monkeys after removal 
of frontal lobes. J Neurophysiol 1942, 5: 295–308.  
43. Chao LL, Knight RT: Human prefrontal lesions increase distractibility to 
irrelevant sensory inputs. Neuroreport 1995, 6: 1605–1610.  
44. Baddeley A, Della Sala S, Papagno C, Spinnler H: Dual-task performance in 
 17 
dysexecutive and nondysexecutive patients with a frontal lesion. 
Neuropsychology 1997, 11: 187–194. 
45. Harper DN, McLean AP, Dalrymple-Alford JC: List item memory in rats: Effects 




Table 1. Animal studies using dual-task paradigms 
 Species Combination of tasks 
Behavioral studies   




 + simple reaction time task  
 Washburn and Astur [10] Monke
y 
DMS + overt OT
b
 or numerical judgment task 
 Basile and Hampton [11] Monke
y 
DMS + motor, image perception, or image 
classification task 




 + perceptual confidence judgment  







 Calder and White [14] Pigeon DMS + VI schedule 
 Maki et al. [15] Rat 8-arm WS
g
 radial maze + 4-arm WS
h
 radial maze  
 Beatty and Shavalia [16] Rat 8-arm WS radial maze + 8-arm WS or WS radial maze  
 Roberts [17] Rat 8-arm WS radial maze + 8-arm WS radial maze  
 Cook and Brown [18] Rat 12-arm WS radial maze + 12-arm WS radial maze  
 Jarrard and Elmes [19] Rat 12-arm WS radial maze + 4-arm WS radial maze 
 Harper et al. [45] Rat SPR
i
 in 12-arm maze + food consumption 
Neurophysiological studies   
 Lebedev et al. [30] Monkey memory-guided saccade + luminance discrimination 
 Messinger et al. [31] Monkey memory-guided saccade + luminance discrimination 
 Miyazaki et al. [32] Monkey memory-guided + visually-guided bimanual motor task. 
 Watanabe and Funahashi 
[33] 
Monkey DMP + spatial attention task 
 
a 
DMS = delayed matching-to-sample task 
b 
OT = object tracking task  
c 
DMP = delayed matching-to-place task 
d 
VI = variable interval 
e 
EXT = extinction 
f 
DRO = differential reinforcement of other behavior 
g 
In the WS (delayed spatial win-shift) radial maze task, animals are required to retain 
spatial information for visited arms both during task performance and across a delay.  
Optimal behavior consisits of visiting each arm without repetition. 
h 
WS = spatial win-shift task 
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Figure 1: Load dependency of the dual-task interference effect in monkeys. (a) The 
DMS task was performed concurrently with one of four kinds of secondary tasks. None, 
no secondary task; Motor, the motor-only task; Image, the image perception task; 
Classify, the classification task. (b) DMS performance in a small-set condition (red 
dashed line) was impaired in a load-dependent manner by adding secondary tasks, while 
no deficit was observed in a large-set condition (black solid line). The horizontal dashed 
line indicates chance level performance. 
 
Figure 2: Prefrontal activities in dual-task-like situations. (a) A schematic diagram of 
the behavioral task. (b) Two examples of ‘specialized’ neurons that encoded either the 
attended (top) or remembered (bottom) location during the delay period. Polar plots 
illustrate spatial tunings of activities for attended (blue line) and remembered (red line) 
locations. (c) An example of ‘multi-tasking’ neurons that encoded both the attended and 
remembered locations with opposite spatial tunings. (d) Comparison of the coding 
efficiency between ‘specialized’ and ‘multi-tasking’ neurons. Decoding accuracy was 
always better when activities of ‘multi-tasking’ neurons were used.  
 
Figure 3: Neural effects of the dual-task interference in monkey prefrontal cortex. (a) A 
schematic diagram of the dual task used in this study. (b) The memory task was 
performed simultaneously with one of five conditions of the attention task that were 
associated with different levels of the cognitive load. (c) The performance of the 
memory task was impaired by the addition of the attention task in a load-dependent 
manner. (d) Population averaged delay-period activity in six task conditions associated 
with different levels of the cognitive load. Sustained delay-period activity was 
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significantly attenuated under the dual-task condition in a load-dependent manner. (e) 
Temporal changes of population-averaged neural signals representing the information of 
the attention cue (magenta), the memory cue (blue), and their interaction (green). 
Significant reawakening of the PEV representing the information of the memory cue 
was observed after the end of the attention task. PEV, proportion of explained variance. 
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WS = spatial win-shift task 
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SPR = serial probe recognition task 
 
 
